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SECRET

Office Memorandum

POLICY PLANNING STAFF

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OCT 20 1950

Department of State

TO : S/P - Mr. Watts

DATE: October 20, 1950

FROM : ARA - Mr. Halle

SUBJECT:

I attach a copy of the paper that was referred to during our conversation at lunch today. It covers much of the ground of a recent memorandum from Mr. Miller to Mr. Nitze, but develops the basic reasoning a great deal farther and culminates, beginning on page 13, in certain policy recommendations that emerge from the logic of the situation described in the preceding pages.

This is just a draft under consideration in ARA.

Louis J. Halle, Jr.

SECRET 10/9/50

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NOTES FOR A REDEFINITION OF US INTER-AMERICAN POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The general inter-American policy of the US was developed and defined a score of years ago with reference to a situation that no longer exists. Until World War II our general foreign policy was isolationist. Our purpose was to avoid entangling alliances overseas, to keep our own "New World" insulated and intact. Even after the outbreak of World War II, our inter-American policy was shaped to the single end of keeping the hemisphere neutral. At Panamá in 1939 we got the Latin Americans to agree to drawing a line around our continents ~~that~~ the outlanders from overseas, whatever colors they flew, were forbidden to carry their ~~battle~~ ~~dress~~. The isolationism that excluded the other countries embraced the Latin Americans. Our relations with them constituted a major part of all our foreign relations. In fact, it was said with some truth that the only foreign policy we had was our Good Neighbor Policy, which was a corollary of hemisphere isolationism.

2. The revolution in our policy came with our decision to espouse, at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, a United Nations without regional components (in opposition to the British concept of an inter-regional union). At San Francisco in 1945 we committed ourselves wholly to the concept of "one world", without seams, to the dismay of the Latin Americans who embarrassed us by forcing the inclusion in the Charter of provisions for regional organization. The Latin Americans were defending the inter-American system in the face of what they recognized as the defection of the US.

3. In 1945 we were still hoping that, through the UN, we might share major world responsibility equitably with the UK, France, China, and the USSR. Soviet imperialism and the alarming weakness of the other powers, however, destroyed the dream of "one world" and forced us, virtually alone, to accept responsibility for saving civilization all around the Soviet perimeter. The big oceans that had been moats for our defense became highways to connect us with ~~our~~ new allies. Our hastily created North Atlantic community, on the Soviet perimeter, was granted the priority of attention that we had formerly given our inter-American community.

whom we had to save.

4. The consequences of our jump from hemisphere isolationism to world leadership created serious unhappiness among the

Latin

Latin Americans, who felt that we had committed ourselves to reserving the best places at our table for them. They did not properly understand the changed situation. The fact that we did not altogether appreciate its significance ourselves is indicated by our assumption that our Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930's was essentially unaffected, although we had distractions now that made it harder for us to give it full attention.

5. In 1950, however, with the dust settling and the basic international relationships of the post-war era emerging, it becomes evident that our inter-American policy-definitions of the 1930's are obsolete. The old kind of world has passed away. We have to decide what the place and role of Latin America is in the new kind of world that has taken its place. Until we decide this we have no basis for determining what contribution we may expect our inter-American relations to make to our security and, consequently, what are the requirements that our inter-American policy must now meet. A reassessment of our inter-American relations and a redefinition of our inter-American policy are overdue.

II. THE WORLD SETTING, 1950

6. The world in which Latin America today seeks to pursue its historic development is a world divided into two opposed camps, one under the direction of the USSR, the other under the leadership of the US. This division is the product of the aggressive ambitions of the USSR, on the one side, and the resistance of the free nations on the other.

7. The two groupings, based on different ideologies, are different in nature. The Soviet coalition represents the will of one government supported by states which it has captured and deprived of their own independent wills. The other coalition, by contrast, is an association freely entered into by its members from motives of self-preservation. It represents a joining of sovereign wills. The position of the US as leader of the free world is therefore intrinsically different from that of the USSR as dictator of a slave world.

8. In the free-world coalition, as in any democratic system, power and responsibility are diffused. Decisions are reached by representational procedures. The US, as leader of such a coalition, cannot dispose of the arbitrary ~~power~~ authority enjoyed by the Soviet Union on its side.

9. There is more variety in the positions of the free states within their coalition than is to be found in the

association

association of Soviet captives. The free states occupy positions of widely varying influence and responsibility in the coalition, reflecting differences in size, geographical location, political development, economic strength, and cultural influence. Contrast the UK and Luxembourg, France and Honduras.

10. Some of the members of the free coalition are more closely bound and committed to that coalition than are others. Thus India has committed itself only partially and tentatively, while Canada is wholly committed.

11. The heart of the free-world coalition, however, consists of two organized regional groups based on formal treaties of alliance: (a) the inter-American group with its Rio Treaty; (b) the North Atlantic group with its similar North Atlantic Treaty. The leadership of the US is manifested in the fact that it is the only state which belongs to both of these groups and has subscribed to both treaties.

It is worth a reminder here, for later reference, that there is another group of states within the coalition: the British dominions under the leadership of the UK. From a position only less central than that of the US in the general coalition, the UK confronts certain similar problems by virtue of the fact that it is a member of the NATO at the same time that it bears the responsibility of leadership among the dominions. Like the US, it also rides two horses.

12. In order for it to work, the coalition of free states must have a common agreed policy. Our new position of leadership makes it necessary for us to think in terms of "hemispheric policy", of "North Atlantic policy", of the "policy of the free world", rather than in terms of "US policy" only. This means we have to accept the fact that US foreign policy cannot be finally determined in Washington alone, any more than UK foreign policy can be finally determined in London alone. The necessity of establishing an identity between US policy, the policies of the regional groups that we head, and the policy of the general coalition requires us to consult, in the development of our policy, New York, Paris, Oslo, Rio de Janeiro, and the other capitals of the free world. As leader of the coalition we are no more free today to have a purely national policy than the President of the US is free to have a purely personal policy.

13.

13. The representative character of the coalition and the leadership of the US require us to give thought to the development of political machinery and procedures for bringing together all views and interests in the continuing evolution of a common policy. The specific objective must be to insure that, in exercising its leadership, the US truly represents its allies and therefore enjoys their support as its constituents.

The US has been attending to this necessity in its relations with the other members of its North Atlantic alliance, with increasingly constructive results. It has been neglecting this necessity in its relations with the members of its inter-American alliance, in consequence of which their support has been weakening.

III. THE INTER-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

14. If our North Atlantic alliance should fail of its purpose we would have to fall back on our inter-American alliance. The North Atlantic alliance occupies a front-line position in the strategy of the "cold war"; the inter-American alliance stands in reserve. The importance of our inter-American alliance does not, therefore, manifest itself in the urgent terms that today requires us, by contrast, to concentrate on the development of our North Atlantic alliance. The full importance of our inter-American alliance becomes evident only as we lift our gaze from the immediate operational problems of today and look at possible future developments.

(a) Our policy counts on the cooperation of Latin America in certain contingencies. It has defined the role that Latin America must play in the event of another global war. It has estimated the raw materials to be supplied by Latin America, and the military forces that Latin America is to apply to the defense of the hemisphere. In its longest range, our policy has also to take account of what would be required of Latin America for our survival if the rest of the free world fell under the control of the USSR.

(b) The assumption on which our policy and our estimates are based is that, when and if such contingencies arose, the Latin American contributions would be forthcoming on a voluntary basis in terms of established cooperation within the inter-American system. Our dependence on the effective functioning of the inter-American system would be very nearly complete if our

policy

policy should not prosper, if a global war should come, or if we should be driven back from Europe, Africa, and Asia.

(c) Because of our confidence in the assumption that Latin America will cooperate, we have presumably made no estimate of what the cost to us would be if the essential requirements from Latin America for our survival were not to be had for the asking. The fact is, however, that during World War I such key Latin American states as Mexico and Venezuela were disposed more toward our enemies than toward us.

15. The Monroe Doctrine still represents basic US policy. It is, however, a contingent policy, a policy in reserve. The UN system would have to break down before there was occasion to invoke it.

16. Although the greatest importance of our inter-American alliance is contingent, we are substantially dependent upon it for the realization of our present policy. (a) Our leadership in the UN must count on the votes of the Latin Americans, since they represent between 1/3 and 1/2 of all the votes that support it. (b) The production of certain raw materials in Latin America is an essential element in the economic strength of our coalition. (c) Because the American states are geographically and historically a part of that "New World" which was dedicated to freedom, their success in making freedom work effectively, in meeting the aspirations of their peoples, has an incalculable moral influence throughout the world. It is, in a sense, an essential basis for winning the ideological war between the camps that divide the world.

17. Both the immediate and the reserve importance of our inter-American alliance can also be appreciated by looking at its negative possibilities. We must be mindful not only of the strength that Latin America has to give us but of the weakening effect on ourselves and on the coalition of any failure on the part of the Latin American states to maintain their political and economic viability. The potential capacity of our Latin American allies to become charges upon our strength, especially at a time when we are deeply involved elsewhere, is almost without limit; for the fact is that, in case of economic and social breakdown in Latin America, the US could not escape responsibility for preventing chaos and starvation. Yet economic insecurity has reached an advanced stage in some of the Latin American countries, notably Bolivia, Ecuador, and

Haiti

Haiti. It is not unrealistic to contemplate the possibility of a rather complete breakdown of political, social, and economic organization in those countries.

18. It is also not unrealistic to contemplate the possibility of further conflicts between states within the inter-American system, such as were common until a dozen years ago, such as would split inter-American solidarity and, perhaps, make the continued working of the inter-American system impossible. The inter-American system has shown itself at its best of late years in preventing this sort of thing, and we therefore have grounds for some assurance; but we cannot be sure that the repercussions of severe breakdowns in individual Latin American states would not extend to renewals of inter-American conflict.

IV. THE STATE OF US-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

19. It was to be expected that with the victorious conclusion of World War II there would be a degree of relaxation in the bonds of inter-American solidarity, as part of the general let-down, since there was no longer an imminent common danger to hold the group together.

20. Add to this the inevitable implications for Latin America of our shift from isolation to world leadership. Throughout our history, until the end of World War II, we had identified our security with that of the Latin Americans and had distinguished them favorably from the nations of the "Old World" with which we sought to avoid entangling alliances. The passing of our hemisphere isolationism, at San Francisco, and our assumption of world leadership spoiled the coziness of our inter-American relations. Our new allies in West Europe, of strategic necessity, displaced the Latin Americans from their position of priority in our estimation.

21. With the termination of the war the US suffered a revulsion of feeling and allowed itself to give expression, in its policy, to a hitherto suppressed impatience with Latin American failings. The intimacy of our inter-American relations suddenly appeared as an impediment to the discharge of our world responsibilities. Because our concept of the UN was deliberately opposed to regionalism, the inter-American system seemed to threaten the UN's integrity. We were afraid there would be a Latin American bloc, which would set a precedent for an Arab bloc, and so on. Latin American demands upon our attention and our confidence, and Latin American votes at San Francisco, seemed out of all proportion to the diminished importance

importance of Latin America in the "one world" we were then establishing. We felt that the Latin Americans had been pampered and spoiled by the naive enthusiasm of our Good Neighbor Policy, and that we should have to put them back in their places. Suddenly recalling the prevalence of dictatorships among them, and Argentina's failure to cooperate in the war-effort, we indefinitely postponed the Rio Conference, which had been intended to cement our inter-American relations by a treaty that would represent the culmination of a decade's steady development. We promoted divisive influences by distinguishing the "good" Latin American states from the "bad".

22. The hardening of our attitude toward Latin America, like our demobilization after VJ Day, was a manifestation of our faith in the concept of "one world". The unanticipated growth of the communist menace, however, in 1946 and '47, aroused a storm of opposition within our own government that brought to an end the more extreme forms of our "get tough" policy with the Latin Americans. Again we began to feel the need for solidarity. A reconciliation with Argentina was undertaken, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, which had been slated for extinction, was authorized to continue its programs of inter-American cooperation. The Rio Conference was held after all, and the conclusion of the Rio Treaty betokened the restoration of the inter-American alliance, although in a changed world context.

23. Latin America also began to suffer, in the post-war world, the dire consequences of wartime economic dislocations. These consequences were aggravated by popular expectations that had been built up to make the objective of victory seem worthwhile. The necessity of post-war sacrifice, without the wartime incentive, gave rise among the Latin Americans to a self-pitying introspection that undermined self-respect. The corollary of self-pity was jealousy and resentment of others.

24. While the Rio Treaty had revived the inter-American alliance, the cozy days of hemisphere isolation were, of necessity, over. With the USSR threatening imminent expansion to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast, we could no longer give major attention to the problems and plaints of the Latin Americans who clamored for our attention. Concentrating all our attention where all of it was needed, and acting swiftly, we intervened in Greece and Turkey, we inaugurated the multi-billion-dollar ERP to rescue Western Europe, we concluded the North Atlantic Treaty on the model of the Rio Treaty, and we undertook to

arm

arm the non-American world on the Soviet periphery at our expense. The Latin Americans, all this while, sat in our outer offices and watched the rest of the world troop through. The effect on their attitudes was not a happy one.

25. An immediate post-war retrogression in our inter-American relations was, in some degree, to be expected. The persistence of such a condition into what has become essentially a pre-war period is another matter. This continuing demoralization in our inter-American relations through the last quarter of the 1940's, the period of the "cold war", contrasts with the solidification of our relations with the rest of the free world. It has persisted in the face of a mounting common danger, that of communism, which should have been substantially more conducive to solidarity than was the Nazi-Fascist danger in the 1930's. There have been no large Russian minorities in the Americas as there were German and Italian minorities, although the adherents of communist doctrine represent a partial equivalent. With the slight and qualified exception of Guatemala, the governments have all been in the hands of men who regard communism as the greatest of all possible menaces.

26. In the year 1950 we can still count on substantial inter-American cooperation in the contingency of global war. We can also count on substantial inter-American cooperation in the prosecution of the "cold war", especially in the United Nations. The fact is, however, that since 1948 we have had grave doubts as to whether we could enter another general inter-American conference or Meeting of Foreign Ministers without finding ourselves frustrated, embarrassed, and defeated by the preponderant opposition of the Latin American votes to our own. We have been able to contribute relatively little to the realization of the possibilities of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council for the same reason--i.e., we dare not risk defeat in connection with many matters of substance that we might otherwise agree to place on its agenda. Finally, although we can probably still count on active inter-American cooperation in extremity, the Korean crisis has shown the degree of apathy that we must now expect in contingencies short of the extreme. The Latin Americans have lost some of their erstwhile sense of identification between their interests and ours. A further deterioration in our inter-American relations might lead to an eventual situation in which we were no longer justified in assuming that we could count on the voluntary cooperation of the other American states in the event of disaster.

V.

V. FAILURES OF POLICY

27. Five years having elapsed since San Francisco, we are now in a position to exercise hindsight. Perhaps we can best determine what we should do in the future by reference to what we might have done in the past.

28. Our concentration on the rescue of Europe, beginning in 1946 and 1947, caused us in large measure to overlook the needs and sensibilities of our allies on this side of the ocean. Consequently, we took no steps to avoid or mitigate the misunderstandings with them to which our European policies gave rise. Worse than that, we contributed explicitly to those misunderstandings and were confused ourselves. The salient fact, from the point of view of our relations with Latin America, was that our interventions in Europe were strategic rather than charitable. The motive for those interventions was not friendship but security, the national security of the US which we had always recognized as being synonymous with the security of the hemisphere. Here was the firm basis of our common interest and our solidarity in confronting the problems of the rest of the world. For a decade and a half we had indoctrinated the Latin Americans with the concept ~~of common responsibility~~ and preceding instruments for hemisphere security. Under the Rio Treaty any threat to hemisphere security would warrant consultation for the purpose of arriving at an agreed policy for dealing with it. Throughout the 1930's there had been one consultation after another among the American states to maintain an agreed policy on hemisphere security. Whatever touched the defense of the hemisphere, after the war as before, should therefore properly have made the other American states our colleagues and co-workers. It should have made them willing to share decision, responsibility, and sacrifice. This concept, if it had governed our diplomacy at the moment, would have prompted us to develop our European aid programs as expressions of a common American policy whereby the New World, in the defense of western civilization, marched forth to the rescue of the Old. We should have identified the Latin Americans with our policy. Instead, we were too busy to talk with them and we left them to read in the newspapers about what we, the US, were doing for stricken Europe. When they came in to ask us about it, we sought to appease them by telling them there would be something in it for them too--gravy in the form of off-shore purchases (most of which never materialized). At Bogotá in 1948 we made a special point of telling them that we would, as a demonstration of friendship, cut them in on the same sort of US aid that Europe was getting. Having thus accepted a

debasement

debasement of our whole inter-American relationship, we were surprised when those who had recently had the right to regard themselves as our allies, rather than as suitors for crumbs from our table, continued resentful and unhappy.

29. This debasement of our inter-American relationships explains the deterioration of our inter-American relations. We have connived with the Latin Americans themselves at their demoralization by agreeing to regard them as our wards rather than our allies, our clients rather than our colleagues. We have accepted the false premise on which they pressed their claims. The central problem is in what has consequently happened to Latin American self-respect.

30. The contrast between the relationships we sustain within our North Atlantic alliance and those we sustain within our inter-American alliance is not only economic. The leaders of the North Atlantic community stand in our confidence. They are engaged in continuous consultation with our own leaders at the highest levels on the whole range of problems that confront the coalition of the free world. Except in the UN (where, consequently, we get better Latin American support than anywhere else), we communicate with the Latin Americans on world problems only when there is something specific we want them to do. Those who once marched proudly by our side are now expected to follow in our rear.

31. Canada is a self-respecting country:
Our relations with Canada are good.

Brazil was a self-respecting country:
Our relations with Brazil were good.

Brazil has suffered a loss of self-respect:
Our relations with Brazil have deteriorated.

Self-respect, among all participants, is the condition precedent to any sound friendship or alliance. Self-respect was the keystone of the Good Neighbor Policy from its inception. It was the key word in the original pronouncement. Whatever we may now do to mend our inter-American fences we must do with a view to restoring Latin American self-respect.

32. Our natural tendency has been not to recognize this key problem of self-respect because the Latin Americans, dazzled by prospects of charitable largesse, have not themselves dwelt on it. It manifests itself in ways that take us all by surprise, as when the Latin Americans at Bogotá did not applaud Secretary Marshall's announcement

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of increased US aid for them on the basis of a second priority. The Latin American demands which we have accepted in principle, however, merely reflect the loss of self-respect that is the consequence of the more intangible factors in our diplomatic neglect. If the Latin American states felt that they were marching by our side, that they occupied a position more like that of Canada than of Saudi Arabia, they would be less disposed to ask for handouts.

33. This points a moral, which is that the solution of our problem is not to be found in the economic field alone. A more generous economic policy will not achieve its purpose without a more generous diplomatic policy; and a more generous diplomatic policy will enable us more effectively to limit the generosity of our economic policy.

VI. OBSTACLES TO A SOLUTION

34. We cannot effectively plan the solution of our problem if we do not recognize the difficulties that it presents. The demoralization of the Latin Americans has already progressed to a point at which they assert a right to our dole and equate our friendship with dollars. They have not effectively been told and they do not understand the relationship between our policy overseas and the security of the hemisphere we all share in common. In talking with them we have hardly used the term "hemisphere security", which was the burden of our song in the 1930's. We have not made it clear to them that our aid programs are dictated by the strategic considerations of the "cold war", and that those considerations are as pertinent to them as to us. We have persuaded them, instead, that the whole purpose of our aid programs is simply to give everybody a better life--which is something quite different--and they do not see why they are not as well entitled as anyone else to a better life. A very difficult course of re-indoctrination will now be needed to recover the lost ground.

35. The virtually unlimited obligation of the developed nations to help out the underdeveloped nations by official largesse has become accepted. By and large, that is a good thing. So far from gaining gratitude for the aid we give, however, we are bound to arouse dissatisfaction in the degree to which it falls short of meeting all wants. The man to whom you give a nickel for a cup of coffee is soon wondering how you expect him to live on a nickel. There is no easy way out of this dilemma, or perhaps no way out at all, and almost every circumstance sucks us in deeper. We have of necessity set our foot on this path already, however, and must take the rough going it affords.

Increased

Increased economic assistance to Latin America has become an imperative of our policy.

36. Finally and chiefly, there is the tremendous diplomatic burden of making a coalition work. It is easy for us to feel that we have procedural difficulties enough already, in our European alliance, in the UN, in the relations between the executive and legislative branches of our own Government, without, on top of all that, having to negotiate every decision with twenty other American governments. The conduct of our foreign relations could become paralyzed by the burden of procedure. The Secretary of State is already called upon to spend a substantial part of his time and energy urging, cajoling, pulling and pushing the foreign ministers of the UK and France, besides Canadians, Dutch, Australians, and a host of others; he is already called upon to give his time and energy to getting US policy through the UN; he is already called upon to give his time and energy to explaining things to Congress and fending off the congressmen who don't agree; he is already busy enough with all these things so that he cannot sit down to a host of inter-American meetings and give the Latin American governments the attention he gives to those North Atlantic allies whose business is more urgent. All this applies equally throughout the levels of our Government at which supra-regional policy is conducted. The difficulty is not lessened for us by the fact that we have for so long enjoyed the luxury of independent policy, which went with our isolationism, that we are, today, more than ever reluctant to subject ourselves to all the onerous disciplines that are the corollary of world responsibility. In the short time we have had, moreover, we have not been able to perfect the governmental machinery for dealing simultaneously on the large number of fronts that now demand our attention. We are not yet organizationally equipped for it.

37. It is necessary to recognize that we may have to accept losses at some points in order to concentrate our attention on more important points. It may be argued that the importance of giving all our attention to Europe in 1946 to '48 outweighed the deterioration of our inter-American relations that was the unavoidable price. It may be argued that the same principle holds today. This would, however, be an extreme position. What we have to do is to find an accomodation between our procedural difficulties and the requirements of policy. We are dealing with matters of degree.

VII.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Objectives

38. Our inter-American policy should embrace the following objectives:

(a) To identify Latin American strategic interests in the world with US strategic interests in the world by giving them the common context of hemisphere security.

(b) To identify Latin American policy in the world with US policy in the world by establishing the common context of hemisphere policy.

(c) To identify Latin America with the US in the implementation of hemisphere policy.

(d) To establish these identities in the minds of the Latin Americans and thereby to give them a sense of honorable participation with the US in the cause of saving freedom.

(e) To develop Latin American support of US representation and leadership in the world by providing means for bringing Latin American views to bear on the formulation and implementation of common policy.

(f) To promote the self-respect and self-reliance of the other American states.

(g) To secure the political independence and economic viability of the other American states on the strongest possible basis.

(h) To strengthen inter-American solidarity through the continuing development of the inter-American system.

B. Policy implementation

39. We should rehabilitate the term "hemisphere security". It should be set to music, used in diplomatic negotiations, blazoned on documents, and broadcast over VOA. It should be presented to Latin America as the key to our global policy. In Korea we are fighting for "hemisphere security". A grant of funds to India is designed to bolster "hemisphere

security

security". We give arms to France for "hemisphere security". There is nothing meretricious about this explanation. It is more fundamentally true (and less damaging) than any assertion that our policy is dictated by our hearts.

40. We should always give "hemisphere security" the context of common responsibility. "Hemisphere security" is not a gift from us to our neighbors but the fruit of a common effort. It is the great objective of OAS policy; it is the common goal of all inter-American cooperation; it is the foundation of inter-American solidarity. This approach will establish the indispensable identity that has certainly been forgotten when the Latin Americans can think of the "cold war" as a struggle for supremacy between the US and the USSR, with the US trying to enlist allies by promising donations toward a better life (rather than pointing to common interest and common peril). This approach will help restore self-respect.

41. We should as a matter of major policy, determined at the highest level, accept an obligation toward the other American states essentially like that of the UK toward the self-governing dominions. That obligation would be: (a) to represent them in our negotiations with the North Atlantic Treaty countries, the countries of the Far Eastern Commission, etc.; and (b) to consult with them so that we know we are representing them. Such a policy would, for example, require us to consult with the Latin Americans, all of whom are at war with Japan, before sitting down ~~with~~ in the FEC to draft a Japanese peace treaty; just as the UK would unfailingly consult with the dominions in like circumstances, onerous as that might be.

42. We should devise and develop workable procedures for such consultation. In order to be workable, such procedures would have to be based on the hierarchical principle that necessarily runs throughout the free-world coalition. Power and responsibility are not evenly distributed among the Latin Americans any more than they are among the Europeans. Just as Luxembourg has a different position from France, so Honduras has a different position from Brazil. Our consultative relations with Honduras would not be on the same plane as our consultative relations with Brazil (if only because Honduras would not have a Foreign Office capable of sustaining such relations). Where it is desirable to develop a common position among the twenty-one American states, we might begin by developing such a position among the three or four most important ones. They might then serve as our diplomatic allies in obtaining the agreement of the others. This would greatly diminish the procedural difficulties.

43.

43. We should give substantially the same sort of time and attention to developing diplomatic programs that we have necessarily given of late years to developing economic programs.

44. Special arrangements should be made whereby G (or S/A) takes an active responsibility with ARA for implementing the policy of consultation and representation proposed above. Close liaison should be established here to compensate for the regional limitations of ARA's preoccupations.

45. The basic instrument of consultation would be the telegraph. We can instruct our embassies on the background of a problem and ask them to discuss it with the respective foreign offices along whatever lines our policy requires. When we are going into a specialized meeting (say of the FEC to discuss a Japanese peace treaty), we might in advance inform the Government of, say, Peru, through our Embassy, that we know it has a valid interest in the terms of peace with Japan and we would welcome any views it might wish to give us before we went into the meeting. In many cases we would get no views, but we would still have the credit of having consulted. On some occasions we would be embarrassed by the position which the consulted government took, but this is a normal risk of diplomacy.

46. We should continue our successful liaison work in the UN. This liaison work illustrates much of what has been said in this memorandum. It is noteworthy that inter-American solidarity is more effective in the UN today than anywhere else. (One result of this has been to lull many who are not in intimate contact with inter-American affairs into an excessive sense of assurance regarding the degree to which we can continue to count on Latin American solidarity with us.)

47. We should help the Latin American ambassadors in Washington to keep their governments informed on world developments and the unfolding strategy. They can be briefed as individuals through the geographic offices, as was done in connection with the announcement that the USSR had produced an atomic explosion. They can be briefed by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs on the relationship of great developments overseas to hemisphere security. They can, on occasion, be assembled in a group for a discussion with the Secretary, the Under Secretary, Mr. Matthews, or Ambassador Jessup on matters with which those gentlemen are directly at grips. The same kind of thing might be done with visiting Foreign Ministers and others.

48.

48. In some of these matters we should continue to see if we cannot use Lleras Camargo as our ally, seeking his advice especially on questions of diplomatic approach. No one in Washington is in a better position to give us good answers on many of these questions.

49. We should seek out special allies for special purposes within the inter-American community. Since 1945 we have, on one occasion after another, sent out circulars pleading with the Latin Americans to join the WHO, or to vote for our candidate to head the IRO, or to instruct their delegations at this conference or that to support the US position. (ARA has generally tried to hold this kind of thing in check.) These importunities of ours have often aroused resentment and built up resistance. We have spent our diplomatic strength on them. In many cases we could have done better by sharing the burden with other Latin American states. When Brazil has already agreed with us on a course of action, perhaps Brazil would be willing to urge that course on Uruguay, and perhaps Uruguay would respond more favorably to Brazil than to us.

50. We should avoid taking an apologetic or defensive position before the Latin Americans with respect to the economic assistance we give to them or to others. No country has the right to tell us what we ought to give to it and what we ought not to give to others. Such approaches are out of order. If we put a sharp stop to all attempts at dealing with us on this basis, whenever they are made, we are likely to end up with sounder and friendlier relations than would otherwise be the case. The element of self-respect, on both sides, is again involved.

51. We should keep on promoting self-help through private investment as, in important part, the solution of Latin America's economic problems. Our loan programs and our technical assistance programs should be increased with this end in view and should be designed accordingly.

52. We should avoid, for the next year or two, getting into any general economic conference with the other American states at which the issue will be what it will cost us to get out again. We must avoid meeting with the Latin Americans <u>en masse</u> for the purpose of negotiating some financial settlement that will keep them quiet. (It won't.) We must avoid any sort of a conference in which every roll-call will show twenty to one. As the Latin Americans regain their self-respect, with time and policy on our part, it will again become reasonably safe to talk with them multilaterally on economic relations. For the time being we should shun it in favor of bilateralism.

53.

53. It would be most desirable to find some opportunity within the next year for holding a Meeting of Foreign Ministers to deal with hemisphere security. Presumably we shall continue to have world emergencies great enough to provide occasion for such a meeting. The agenda should be confined to political questions and world strategy. If at all possible, the Secretary should represent the US, at least at the opening sessions. The US delegation might also include some other spokesman for world strategy, such as Mr. Dulles, Ambassador Jessup, Mr. Harriman, or Mr. Matthews. Senator Lodge might also be on it. The Latin Americans at the meeting would be indoctrinated in the world situation and the broad requirements of hemisphere security, and the meeting would produce a formal implemented dedication of the American states to common effort. Such a meeting would not only be a shot-in-the-arm for inter-American morale, making the Latin Americans feel that they were once more in on the fight for freedom, it would provide a propaganda advantage in the "war for men's minds" all over the world.

54. Finally, Mr. Miller might give one or several major speeches devoted, not to intra-regional affairs, but to relating our regional affairs to the problems of the world at large.

55. In presenting these recommendations for action to be taken, the governing concept has not been one of setting off a new inter-American policy like a fire-cracker. It has, rather, been one of re-aligning our sights, re-plotting our course, reinforcing our diplomacy, refocussing our propaganda--all with a view to establishing a better basis for self-respect among the members of the inter-American community, restoring them to the status of our allies, strengthening inter-American solidarity in support of our leadership, and bringing about a situation in which we can once more deal confidently with them on the economic front. Much can be accomplished only by persistent determination and the working out of problems in practice. Nevertheless, if we can contrive the psychological moment and make our preparations well, we may be able by a Foreign Ministers' Meeting to register the kind of triumph of which the inter-American system today stands in need, and thereby get ourselves on a better basis overnight, both at home and abroad.